Asset & Security Intelligence · Sete Lagoas Transportes LTDA

Cognito Asset Intelligence Platform

Cognito is a multi-tenant asset management, security monitoring, and helpdesk platform spanning roughly 130,000 lines of Go, TypeScript, and C++. Signed Windows agents report inventory and live system metrics over MQTT into a bounded, back-pressured Go pipeline; TimescaleDB holds the time series, and tenant isolation is enforced by the database rather than the application.

Production
Results
125 endpoints, in productionFleet
Idempotent ingest, replayable overflowDelivery
Enforced by PostgresTenant Isolation
−50% bytes/opHot-Path Allocation
Architecture
Windows Agent Fleet connects to MQTT Broker via MQTT · QoS 1 control, 0 sampling. MQTT Broker connects to Bounded Ingest Queue via Non-Blocking Admission. Bounded Ingest Queue connects to Telemetry Writer via Single Consumer. Telemetry Writer connects to Dead-Letter Store via Retry Exhausted. Telemetry Writer connects to Tamper Detector. Telemetry Writer connects to CVE Correlation. Telemetry Writer connects to TimescaleDB. Tamper Detector connects to TimescaleDB. CVE Correlation connects to TimescaleDB. TimescaleDB connects to Realtime Fan-Out via Read Model. Realtime Fan-Out connects to Operator Dashboard via WebSockets.
Engineering Notes

In daily production use across 125 endpoints, where it has caught real hardware tampering from snapshot diffs, CVE exposure correlated across multiple machines, and disk, network, and endpoint-detection alerts surfaced through the UniFi and Bitdefender integrations.

Admission is a non-blocking send onto a bounded channel, so what happens when the pipeline saturates was decided up front rather than discovered under load. Overflow retries briefly, then lands in a durable dead-letter table that a replayer drains with backoff.

Every ingest is keyed by agent, snapshot timestamp, and a SHA-256 of the raw payload, and checked against a retention-bounded ledger before any write — so an agent retrying a publish collapses into a single state transition instead of repeating the work.

Change detection was profiled and rewritten to compare normalized content hashes rather than marshalling both snapshots to JSON, halving allocation on the hottest path and removing a database round trip from the common, unchanged case.

Every tenant-scoped table carries a row-level security policy read from a transaction-local setting, so an application-layer bug cannot return another tenant's rows — Postgres will not produce them.

The endpoint agent was written twice. The original is a C++23 implementation using std::expected and a DPAPI-encrypted local cache, driven by event triggers behind an RAII debouncer; the Go agent that supersedes it discharges the same responsibilities under a concurrent probe model.

Agent releases are cross-compiled in CI and Ed25519-signed, and the updater refuses an unsigned binary outright. Remote commands carry hierarchically derived HMAC tokens whose signed payload binds the result and the timeout, so an agent cannot extend its own authorization.

Core Technologies
GoTypeScriptReactTimescaleDBMQTTCentrifugoUniFiBitdefenderC++23 (prior agent)